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Summary findings
All of Zambia's  pension  schemes  are deficient  in design,  In  the short  and medium  term  the objectives  of
financing,  and  administration.  Zambia  must  restructure  pension  reform  should  be  to settle  outstanding  pension
its social protection  system  to complement  its new  claims,  revise  early  retirement  provisions  and investment
economic  strategy.  That  restructuring  must  address  such  policies,  and improve  capabilities  for  administering
basic problems  as:  statutory  pension  funds.
*  The  macroeconomic  fhlctuations  and unstable  In the long  term  the  objectives  should  be to convert
financial  sector  that  make  effective  pension  fund  the  ZNPF  into  a modest  basic pension  scheme  for  private
management  impossible.  sector  employees,  and  subsequently  integrate  civil
*  High  inflation  rates  (which  erode  the  real value  of  servants  and  public  sector  employees  into  that  scheme;
reserves)  and  politically  motivated  low-yield  investments  establish  regulatory  provisions  for the  development  and
and  loans.  supervision  of private  pension  funds;  and establish  an
*  Income  ceilings  that  are  not  adjusted  regularly  for  administrative  mechanism  (for  example,  a permanent
inflation.  committee)  to review  social protection  policy  and
*  Overgenerous  pension  benefits  for  the public  sector,  supervise  and  coordinate  its application  by all agencies.
intended  to compensate  for  social hardship  resulting
from  economic  adjustment.
*  Inadequate  management  of pension  fund  operations.
This paper  - a product  of the Financial  Sector  Development  Department  - is part  of a larger effort  in the department  to
study  pension  systems  and contractual  savings. Copies  of the  paper  are available  free from  the World  Bank,  1818  H Street
NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.  Please  contact  Hedia  Arbi,  room  G8-149,  telephone  202-473-4663,  fax  202-522-3190,
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Social security schemes in Zambia are designed to provide protection against loss of income due
to retirement, disability or survivorship to urban workers and their dependents. There are several social
programs  and  an  insignificant social assistance  scheme  which  provide  nutritional  support  and  other
benefits to the poor based on means-testing. Comprehensive social protection, however,  is not available
to the vast majority of the population.
Retirement benefits are provided by statutory pension funds which mandatorily cover all  formal
sector workers and by voluntary occupational pension funds set up by individual employers. The statutory
funds officially cover around 477,000 employees, corresponding to more than 90 percent of the formal
sector labor force but only about 13 percent of the total labor force. The total assets of  all statutory funds
currently correspond to about 1.6 percent of GDP, down from well over 10 percent in the 1980s.
The largest fund is the Zambia National Provident Fund (ZNPF), a compulsory savings scheme
for  private sector employees. The ZNPF  collects contributions from employers and  employees,  keeps
individual member accounts and provides lump-sum benefits upon retirement. An estimated 40 percent of
all private sector employees are additionally enrolled in private pension plans.
Civil servants and employees of local authorities are covered by separate pension funds, the Civil
Service Pension  Fund (CSPF)  and the Local  Authorities Superannuation Fund  (LASF).  Both schemes
were designed as funded systems and provide defined retirement benefits based on the last annual salary
and the years of service.
All  pension  schemes  in  Zambia  suffer  from  a  series  of  significant  weaknesses  reflecting
deficiencies in their design, in their financing and in their administration. These deficiencies have not
only been exposed but aggravated by the economic crisis and the radical measures necessary to face its
structural  causes.  Zambia  needs  to  restructure  its  social  protection  system  to  correspond  to,  and
complement, its new economic strategy. The main problems which need to be addressed are summarized
as follows:
*  Macroeconomic fluctuations and the instability of the financial sector have negatively  affected
pension fund management.  Revenue from contributions has  been declining due  to unemployment and
insolvency in the private sector as well as retrenchments and budgetary constraints in the public sector.
*  The real value of their reserves has been eroded through high inflation rates and the channeling of
resources into politically motivated low-yield investment and loans under the previous government.  The
real rate of return was highly negative during the 1980s, as low as -25 percent for members' balances and
somewhat less negative on fund assets.
*  The  income ceilings applied in the calculation of ZNPF  contributions have  not been  adjusted
regularly for inflation. Because of high inflation rates, the ceiling fell to the equivalent of US$20 in 1995.
This  resulted  in very  low, practically flat-rate contributions of  only K. 1,500  or  US$2 per  month to
members'  accounts.  Given  the  disastrous  financial performance,  however,  the  failure  to  adjust  the
contribution ceiling was a blessing in disguise.
2*  Pension benefits  were  used to  compensate for  the  social hardship  caused  by  public  sector
adjustment measures. The funds were obliged to award generous early retirement benefits without being
given the necessary financial  resources.
*  The defined-benefit schemes for public sector employees are running high actuarial deficits and
have accumulated substantial arrears in benefit payments. During the waiting period until a pensioner is
paid, benefits are not adjusted for inflation. Almost all pensioners choose to take the maximum amount as
a lump-sum. The residual pension is also not adjusted for inflation and,  in many cases, the remaining
pension levels are so low that the checks are worth less than the postage required to mail them to the
recipients.
*  All statutory pension funds are  experiencing severe operational problems.  The collection of
contributions  is inefficient and the registers of members and employers have not been kept correctly. Most
funds do  not have accurate information on the actual salaries earned by  their members. The technical
capacity of social security staff is not sufficient  to deal with the administrative  problems.
Private pension plans operate both as defined benefit and defined contribution schemes; private
plans do not exempt employers from contributing to the ZNPF. The majority of private pension funds are
managed by  the  Zambia State  Insurance Corporation (ZSIC); the  state-owned Zambia Consolidated
Copper Mining company (ZCCM) manages its own pension fund for its employees. Some of the private
pension funds have achieved acceptable rates of return, particularly in recent years through investment in
treasury bills and high quality real estate, but the pension plans managed by  state-owned ZSIC have
essentially suffered from the same political interference and thus low or negative real rates of return as the
statutory  pension schemes.
The main problems  identified in the area of private pension funds are  a  lack of legislation,
regulation and  supervision of occupational pension plans,  a  lack of secure and  profitable investment
opportunities which explains why the portfolios of all private pension funds consist only of Treasury Bills
and real estate, and a  lack of qualified management personnel. As in the case of the statutory funds,
monthly pensions are usually not indexed systematically but adjusted for inflation in a  random fashion.
Because  of the diversity of plans and lack of regulation, problems arise in the portability of pension rights.
There  are  three  basic  challenges for  the  establishment and  functioning of pension schemes
which  are  particularly  critical  in the  context of  African  countries.  Design  issues such  as  choices
between defined-benefit and defined-contribution schemes, funding versus pay-as-you-go principles and
public versus private management are subordinated to the basic challenges of macroeconomic stability,
regulatory capacity and ability of coverage extension. These challenges should be taken into account in
setting the objectives and design of a reform strategy.
The objectives of pension reform in Zambia should be in the short to medium term
*  the settlement of outstanding  pension claims
*  the revision of early retirement provisions
*  the revision of reserve investment policies
*  the improvement of the administration  and management of the statutory  pension funds
3and in the long term
*  the conversion of the ZNPF into a modest basic pension scheme for private sector employees with
subsequent integration of civil servants and public sector employees into the same scheme
*  the restructuring of pension schemes for public sector employees and the revision of benefit
formulae to provide the basis for introduction of a core benefit equivalent to that offered by the
new basic pension scheme
*  the establishment  of regulatory provisions for the development  and supervision of private pension
funds including both occupational pension schemes and personal pension plans
*  the establishment  of an administrative  mechanism, for example a high level permanent committee
to regularly review social protection  policy and supervise and coordinate its application by all
institutions  responsible
4ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY  SCHEMES
Social security schemes in Zambia are limited to the provision of protection against loss of income
due to retirement, disability or survivorship and cover only formal sector workers and their dependents.
Benefits  for short-term contingencies  such as temporary incapacity or maternity are the direct
responsibility  of employers under the Employment  Act, supplemented  by collective agreements, which
often also include provision for medical treatment. There is no statutory provision for either family
allowances or for unemployment  benefits. But the Employment  Act requires employers to pay gratuities,
which depend on eamings and length of service, to workers on retirement or on redundancy.
Other  social  security provisions  are  administered by  parastatal organizations each  with  an
independent financial system administered  by a Board responsible to a particular Minister. The Ministry of
Labor and  Social Security is  responsible for  the supervision of the Zambia National Provident Fund
(ZNPF),  the  Workmen's  Compensation Fund (WCF),  and  the  Pneumoconiosis Compensation Board
(PCB). The Cabinet Office is responsible for the supervision of the Civil Service Pensions Fund (CSPF)
and the Ministry of Local Government for the Local Authorities Superannuation Fund (LASF). There is
no overriding authority responsible for the coordination of these various schemes.
TABLE 1: COVERAGE  UNDER PENSION  SCHEMES (INCLUDING  ZNPF)
(Estimated  for 1994)
Scheme  Membership  Number
Statutory Schemes  . l
ZNPF  Prvate sector
Parastatals  355,000
CSPF  Civil servants
Armed  forces
Teachers  100,000




ZSIC  and Private  Insurance  Private  sector
companies  Parastatals  180,000
Mukuba  pension  fund  ZCCM  18,000
Total  198,000
5These statutory funds,  which  are  all  mandatory,  officially cover  about  477,000  employees,
corresponding to more than 90 percent of the formal sector labor force but only about 13 percent of the
total labor force. The ZNPF is the largest scheme; it covers all private sector employees, non-pensionable
civil  servants  and  most parastatal employees.  Most  parastatal employees  are  also  members  of  an
occupational pension scheme which,  although separate for  each organization, is based  on  a  standard
formula, and administered in most cases by Zambia State Insurance Corporation (ZSIC). Some private
employers  also  have  occupational pension  schemes  administered by  ZSIC.  There  is  a  separate
occupational pension scheme for employees of the Zambia Consolidated  Copper Mines Limited (ZCCM) -
the Mukuba Pension Scheme (MPS). It is estimated that about 40 percent of all private sector employees
are additionally enrolled in private pension plans.
Zambia National Provident Fund
The Zambia National Provident Fund (ZNPF) was established in October 1966 as a compulsory
retirement savings scheme. It operates as a defined contribution scheme which means that the Fund has
no  predefined  obligations with respect to  the  level of  old age,  retirement and  survivors'  benefits.
Contributions are accumulated with interest in members' individual accounts. Members are entitled to
withdraw the balance of their accounts when they reach  55 years of age,  retire at  or after age 50,1
become physically or mentally disabled, or emigrate from Zambia; in case of the member's death, the
lump-sum is paid to the designated survivors. Administrative and management expenses of the fund are
supposed to be paid out of investment income.
The scheme includes special provisions for domestic workers in urban areas. This requires a flat
rate monthly contribution  based on a ceiling of K. 1000. Further, the ZNPF provides flat-rate funeral and
maternity grants to members who have contributed for at least two years. These grants are paid out of the
Fund's  Reserve Account  which  is financed from fines charged to  employers and  contributions not
attributable to individual accounts. The ZNPF also offers a Home Ownership Withdrawal Scheme which
allows members to withdraw, on one occasion, up to 60 contributions.
Membership of  the Fund grew steadily from 5,440 in 1966/67 to about 570,000 in 1992/93. This
figure, however, includes members' accounts which have been inactive over an extended period without
further contributions or benefit claimns.  The total number of active contributors  is currently estimated to
be around 350,000 which corresponds to about 70 percent of  formal sector employees. About 14,500
private sector and parastatal employers are registered with the Fund. Evasion and non-compliance by
employers, often with the collusion of employees is a serious problem. Although there seem to be no
national records to identify compliance levels, enquiries suggest that only about 60 percent of employers
are current with their payments and at  least 30 percent are more than 7 months in arrears.  Although
prosecutions are conducted, fines are low.
The importance of ZNPF assets as a share of GDP has been declining dramatically: total assets
fell from 9 percent of GDP in 1980 to 5.8 percent in 1987 and further to about 1  percent of GDP in
1995. This was due both to negative returns on investment of the ZNPF's assets and the decline in the
real value of contributions.
tFor members  who started  contributing  before  April 1, 1973  the respective  ages  are 50 and  45 years.
6The ZNPF has not been able to provide adequate retirement benefits to its members. In part, this
is due to weaknesses in the provident fund system which has no insurance element protecting members
from the consequences  of invalidity, unemployment  or (except to a very limited extent) death. Further, for
most people a  lump-sum benefit represents an unsound basis for long term income security.  But these
inherent weaknesses have been compounded  by deficiencies  in the management of the Fund.
Firstly, the contribution ceiling has not been regularly adjusted to take account of inflation. Until
1995, employers and employees were required to each contribute 5 percent of gross monthly earnings
up  to  an income ceiling  of K.15,000  resulting in a maximum monthly contribution of only K.1,500
(approx. US$ 2 at end-1994). The level of average earnings, however, increased by 700 percent between
1992 and 1994 alone. Due to the failure to revise the ceiling regularly, the scheme has been effectively
operating on  a flat-rate basis with very low real contribution receipts and consequently low members'
balances. The volume of contributions fell by about 90 percent in real terms between 1981 and  1995. In
1995, the ceiling was increased substantially  to K  150,000 (approx. US$ 180); at the same time, due to
strong resistance from both employers and employees the contribution rate was lowered from previously
10 to 7 percent of wages.
TABLE 2:  ZNPF Indicators
1982/83  1985/86  1987/88  1990/91
Real rate of return on  - 5.8  - 5.9  - 39  - 32
assets
Real interest to  - 14.0  - 32  - 32  - 47
members
Real contributions  88  60  39  21
(1981/82  = 100)
Source: ZNPF Actuarial Review 1992
Secondly, from the introduction  of the Fund in 1966  until 1992/93, a nominal interest rate of only
4.5 to 5.5 percent was credited to the statutory contributions in members' accounts. But over the same
period, annual inflation increased from 33 to 200 percent and commercial deposit interest rates rose from
15 to 84 percent. In 1993/94, the 5,000 fund retirees received on average a lump-sum of only K  10,000
(US$14 at the end of 1994). The credibility of the scheme has suffered considerably from such low benefit
levels.
Concern about the low balances in members' ZNPF  accounts led to a decision to increase the
interest rate for members' accounts to 50 percent for  1992/93 and then  100 percent for  1993/94. This
increase was made possible mostly through a revaluation  of real estate owned by the ZNPF and through
yields obtained from investment in Treasury Bills. But investment income is insufficient to meet current
administrative and benefit expenditure. In the following two years,  interest to members' accounts was
reduced again to 50 and 35 percent, respectively. There was an excess of expenditure over income in each
of the last four years but this result is not surprising considering the negative real return on assets linked
with the fact that personnel and other management expenditure has been rising with inflation.
2For  a discussion  of the role of provident  funds  for old age security  see Dixon  1989,  Gruat 1990
7TABLE 3:  ZNPF INDICATORS
(Ratios %)
1981  1985  1990  1995
Administration  22  35  72  102
Expenses/Contributions
Administration
Expenses/Income  from  42  54  223  66
Investment
Interest  to
Members/Income  from  64  59  41  77
Investment
Source:ZNPF  Annual  Reports,  various  years
Until recently, the investment of the Fund was made according to fixed guidelines assigning 50
percent of the reserves to the Government, 35 percent to parastatals and 15 percent to the private sector.
Funds were channeled into long term loans to the Government and to parastatals at low fixed interest
rates.  Funds  were also invested in shares of loss-making parastatal companies. In  1995, almost 50
percent of assets were invested in real estate, 27 percent in government  securities, 16 percent were held
in fixed deposits, and 6 percent in equity. A high proportion of the residential property owned by the
ZNPF is occupied by staff and thus only earning residual income, there are difficulties in the collection
of rents, especially from Government departments, and rents on properties outside of the urban areas are
very low. Moreover, maintenance  costs for buildings have risen at a much faster pace than rents.
The administrative expenses  of the ZNPF have been increasing strongly. Measured as a share of
investment income, they reached a  peak of 254 percent in  1992. As a share of total revenue from
contributions, administrative expenditure peaked in 1995 at 102 percent.  In spite of recent personnel
reductions, the ZNPF is still considerably overstaffed  with currently more than 1,300 employees. Under
the new management increased efforts have been made to reduce administrative costs and scale down
expenses for non-essential activities.  But steps to speed up the process through a substantial retrenchment
program would impose a severe financial burden on the Fund, particularly since its staff pension fund is
also believed to be considerably  underfunded.
3The  experience  of the provident  funds  in Singapore  and Malaysia  shows  that  this system  can be managed
successfully  with  higher  returns  on investment  and  low administrative  expenditure.  SeeVittas  1993,  Queisser
1991,  Valdes-Prieto  1994
8Civil Service (Local Conditions)  Pension  Fund
The Civil Service Pension Fund (CSPF) was established in  1968 as a  funded defined benefit
scheme  to  provide  retirement pensions to  permanently employed civil  servants.  Contributions are
payable by employers and employees each at the rate of 7.25 percent of the pensionable  monthly salary.
In law, there are separate schemes for teachers and members of the armed forces but it has been decided
that these schemes should be integrated with that for civil servants. The practice is for the CSPF to
determine and pay pension entitlement.  Currently, the fund has about 120,000 members. There are
about 30,000 pensioners; thus, the system dependency ratio would be around 25  percent, although
precise data is not available.
Since  1993, the  operation and  finances of the  Fund  have been  effectively separated from
Government. A new secretary was appointed and a new Board established  under the chairmanship of the
Permanent  Secretary of the  Cabinet Office and composed of representatives from the  Ministry  of
Finance, the Ministry of  Labor and Social Security, the National Union of Teachers, the Civil Service
Union of Zambia, the Bank of Zambia, and the Pensioners' Association.  The CSPF has a staff  of about
50 officers, the majority of whom are seconded from the Government. The administrative expenses of
the CSPF are not met by the Fund but covered by the Government. Since no auditing was conducted
recently, accurate information  on administrative  expenditure is currently not available.
As there had been no effective separation of the Fund's accounts from those of Government,
investment of the notional reserves was determined  by Government. It is estimated that the Government
"borrowed" K.360 million from the Fund between 1974 and 1989 (equivalent  to US$ 186 million in real
terms). The nominal interest rates for loans to the Government ranged between 7.5 percent in 1974 and
38 percent in  1989. These loans begin to mature in the year 2010. The Government has in principle
acknowledged its obligations to  the  Fund but has  not specified any  conditions of  repayment. The
Government has  also  been  defaulting on  its  mandatory employers'  contributions to  the  Fund;  no
employers' contributions  have been made since 1991.
Total assets of the CSPF were approximately  K 6.5 billion in 1994, corresponding to about 0.4
percent of GDP. This figure, however, does not adequately reflect the financial situation of the Fund,
since most of these funds accrued during that year due to high yields from investment in Treasury Bills.
More than 60 percent of the reserves were invested in Treasury Bills, the remaining 40  percent was
divided in approximately equal parts between Government bonds and real estate including about K. 1.5
billion in prime properties in Lusaka. The Fund is exempt from paying taxes and investment income is
received without deduction of tax.
The principal legislation covers a range of situations relating to termination of service which
entitle members to benefit payments. The original intention was that the CSPF should be only directly
responsible for  financing pensions for:  (i)retirement at 55  years subject to  10 years of pensionable
employment, (ii) early retirement on grounds of ill health, and (iii) dependent survivors including death
benefits. But there  is also a provision for early  retirement at the choice of the officer either  on  a
marriage, for a female officer, at any time within 5 years of pension age,  or after 20 years service.
Furthermore, there is a provision for retirement of an officer required on abolition of the post, or in the
interests of economy or efficiency, or in the public interest.
9The CSPF pays only benefits for retirement at and after age 55 out of its own resources; all cases of
early retirement will be paid only if the Government has made the necessary funds available. According
to CSPF estimates, approximately  80 percent of all pensioners retire early or under special regimes.
In a defined benefit system such as the CSPF, there is an integral relationship between pension
age, the benefit formulae and the financial system. If pensions are awarded at an earlier age the benefit
level should be reduced. Thus, if such a reduction is not imposed it is reasonable that the Fund should
not be responsible for the financial consequences. But it does not seem reasonable that scarce public
resources should be used to provide retirement benefits on this basis at the expense of the majority of the
population which cannot benefit from this scheme. The Government has recognized that the civil service
is over-staffed and needs to be reduced but the extent of this is dependent on a comprehensive  analysis of
functions within each Ministry which has not yet been completed. In the meantime, the favorable early
retirement and  retrenchment  provisions are  used to  reduce  staff  levels.  Apart  from  the  adverse
implications for the financing of the pension system, self-selection  for early retirement tends to result in
a loss of the most able and qualified staff.
In addition, other generous provisions have been introduced. First,  the pension formula was
modified; it is now based on the last annual salary multiplied by years of service and divided by 660 (55
years in months) instead of 720. Second, a provision was introduced which allowed for two-thirds of the
pension entitlement  to be commuted to a lump-sum (an increase from one-third). Third, a very generous
commutation factor was adopted; at age 55, male retirees receive K 23.14 and female retirees receive K
25.8 for  each Kwacha of converted annual pension. Since the Government is not providing enough
resources for the lump-sum payments, there is a large number of outstanding  claims.
Local Authorities Superannuation  Fund
The Local  Authorities Superannuation Fund (LASF) is a  mandatory pension scheme which
covers the employees of the 61 local authorities as well as the workers of the Zambia Electricity Supply
Corporation (ZESCO), the National Housing Authority and the personnel employed by the LASF itself.
As part  of the decentralization policy, the local authorities are  supposed to eventually become self-
financing. At present, however, at least part of their resources is provided through a grant from the
Ministry of Local Government and Housing (MLGH).
The fund was established in  1954, initially covering only expatriate officers.  In  1963,  the
membership was extended to all employees of local authorities between ages 18 and 50.  The LASF has
approximately 27,000 contributing members and 5,000 pensioners, i.e. the system dependency ratio is
currently around 19 percent.  Initially the contribution rate was 14 percent of pensionable salary equally
divided between the employer and the workers.  If it was subsequently  increased to a total of 33 percent
in 1989 with employees paying 10 percent and employers contributing  23 percent.
10The LASF is managed by a Board which has eleven members nominated by their respective
institutions or organizations and appointed by the Minister (MLGH). The Fund is administered under a
General Manager appointed by the Board. Its records are manually maintained and any computerized
data processing has to  be  contracted to  a  bureau.  Administrative expenditure was  12.4 percent  of
contributions received in  1992; this figure,  however,  does not necessarily indicate a  high  level of
administrative inefficiency, since revenue from contributions has declined due  to noncompliance. In
1993, the number of staff  was reduced by  more than two thirds to 40  employees. During the first
quarter of 1994, administration  expenditure was 2.6 percent of total revenue (including the Government
grant for additional expenses) and 5.3 percent excluding the grant.
The fund operates predominantly as a defined benefit scheme which provides old age, retirement
and disability pensions. As in the case of the CSPF, benefit formulae and eligibility requirements have
been  improved significantly regardless of equity or  financial implications. The  retirement age  was
reduced from 60 to 55 years, local authorities were given discretionary power to retire employees at age
50 with a minimum of 10 years of service, and the commutation  factor applied for the conversion of the
pension to a  lump-sum was increased to match the higher factor applied in the CSPF. In  1990, the
pension formula was changed from being based on the average salary during the last five years to using
only the last annual salary. And in 1991, the Government made retirement mandatory for employees of
local authorities who had completed  22 years of service. Up to two thirds of the monthly pension may be
commuted to a lump-sum  payable immediately  upon retirement. The same high commutation factors are
applied as in the CSPF. There is no indexation mechanism for the adjustment of the remaining monthly
pension payments to inflation.
The LASF is facing a three pronged problem resulting from non-compliance, low investment
income and  increasing expenditure. During recent years,  the LASF has had  increasing difficulty in
collecting contributions. In 1994, compliance  to contribution payments by the local authorities was only
29 percent. The high evasion can also be interpreted as reaction to the dramatic decline of benefit levels
through inflation, the lack of the scheme's credibility and the high degree of political interference in the
management of the scheme.
Although the  Fund  theoretically operates  as  a  funded  pension scheme,  the  income  from
investment of reserves is very low due to erosion of reserves through inflation and prescribed investment
in non-performing assets. In mid 1994, the accumulated fund of the LASF stood at K3.3 billion,  or
about 0.2  percent of GDP, of which K1.8 billion were assets (90 percent fixed assets) and K1.5 billion
revaluation reserves.  The Fund's  reserves are invested in bank deposits (20 percent),  fixed interest
securities (25 percent), loans (10 percent), real estate (35 percent) and equities (10 percent). Loans are
given to associated local authorities and parastatals as well as to members for purchase or construction of
housing. The approval of the Minister is required for  investment of funds in equities and deposits or
shares of the National Building  Society or banks.
The obligation to retire after 22  years service has  led to  a  significant increase in  pension
expenditure. This provision alone has generated liabilities of about K6.3 billion between 1992 and 1994
but  only  K.1.07  billion  were  provided by  Government.  There  are  said  to  be  over  1000 claims
outstanding with the majority of benefit payments delayed by more than a year.  During the waiting
period benefits are not adjusted for inflation.
11The  last actuarial analysis of the  LASF  was conducted in  December  1993.  The  actuaries
encountered  serious data  deficiencies, particularly with  respect to  dates  of birth  and  accumulated
contributions. Further, no reliable data on volume and contingencies  of pension payments was available
at the valuation date. Thus, the analysis had to be based on several assumptions with respect to the
composition of members' age groups, income and contributions  as well as pension payments.
The analysis was conducted considering three different scenarios (retirement of all members at
valuation date, accrual of benefits until current members retire under the various regimes of the LASF,
and full projection of benefits considering future contributions  at current levels). The actuaries concluded
that the LASF is substantially  underfunded even considering only a minimum funding level.
Private Pension Funds
An estimated 40 percent of all  formal sector employees are enrolled in private occupational
pension  schemes.  Private  pension plans operate  both  as  defined  benefit and  defined  contribution
schemes; most of these occupational schemes are contributory. The introduction  of private pension plans
does not exempt employers from contributing  to the ZNPF. The majority of private pension funds (about
75 percent) are managed by the Zambia State Insurance Corporation (ZSIC). The largest occupational
pension scheme is the Mukuba Pension Fund which is owned and managed by the state-owned Zambia
Consolidated Copper Mining company (ZCCM).  6 companies  operate their own pension schemes.
The  private plans managed by  ZSIC (which until 1991 was the only  insurance company in
Zambia), were subject to prescribed investment  under the previous government. Their performance was
therefore not much better than the performance of the statutory pension funds. Starting in  1993, the
performance of private pension funds has improved considerably due to investment in Treasury Bills
which account for the bulk of investment. Funds are further invested in real estate which seems to be
yielding higher returns than the properties owned by the statutory  funds. Private pension funds are trying
to  concentrate on  high-quality residential properties  which are  rented with foreign-exchange based
leases. Other private insurance companies have also started to provide pension plans to companies; these
plans are mostly on a defined benefit  final salary basis.
The ZSIC offers three types of pension schemes to employers:(i)a defined-benefit final salary
scheme, (ii) a money-purchase annuity scheme and (iii) a group annuity scheme. Its experience of the
latter has been unsatisfactory as a result of unfavorable investment policies, inflation and an inability to
change the annuity factors. Most of these schemes are being converted into fully funded defined benefit
schemes. Pension age is usually 55 years and  for early retirement there is an actuarial benefit reduction.
Schemes are usually not indexed for inflation.  Contribution rates vary but typically are 12.5 per cent
from the  employer and  6.25  percent from  the employee. The  ZSIC has  experienced difficulty  in
collecting contributions from some employers. There has also been dissatisfaction both with the low
levels of pensions in real terms and with the lack of opportunity for the employer to influence investment
decisions.
12Figures provided by ZSIC indicate that they currently manage schemes covering some 28,000
active employees and  about 3000 pensioners. The private and parastatal pension schemes generally
provide substantial benefits on  the death of a  member, both by  way of lump sums and widow(er)s'
pensions. Insurance cover is usually taken out, on a group life basis, but premiums are extremely high in
view of the current prevalence of HIV/AIDS.  It appears not untypical for the annual premiums for such
cover to cost the equivalent of 10 percent of the pensionable salary roll,  in addition to the provision
made for "normal" pension benefits.
The  Mukuba Pension  Fund was  established in  1982 and  was originally obligatory for  all
permanent employees of ZCCM but since 1985 it has been voluntary; at that time the membership fell
very sharply, but has since recovered and now amounts to more than 20,000 members. The scheme is
administered by the Mukuba Pensions Trustees Ltd. (MPTL). Board members are appointed both by
ZCCM and the Mineworkers Union. In March 1994 the Fund had assets of K.7 billion of which K.2
billion was invested in Treasury Bills and Government bonds. Most of the fund is invested in property of
high quality and yielding high rentals and the MP has performed well compared to all other pension
funds. Current contribution rates are 10.7 percent of basic monthly pay for the employer and 5 percent
for the employee. Retirement age is 55 for both men and women.
13Conclusions
All  pension  schemes in  Zambia  suffer  from  a  series  of  significant weaknesses reflecting
deficiencies in their design, in their financing and in their administration. These deficiencies have not
only been exposed but aggravated by the economic crisis and the radical measures necessary to face its
structural causes. Zambia needs to restructure its social protection system to correspond and complement
its new economic strategy. The main problems which need to be addressed are summarized as follows
None of the schemes has been able to provide adequate retirement benefits to its members. In
the case of the ZNPF, benefits were reduced to practically non-significant  levels. This is the result of a
combination of factors: low contributions due to the failure to adjust the ceiling, high inflation rates,
low-yielding investments guided mostly by political considerations, and an interest rate policy which
gave members negative real rates of return over an extended period of time. In addition, the operating
costs of the ZNPF have been growing to the point where they exceed revenue from contributions.
The defined-benefit schemes for public sector employees offer very generous benefits which
have proven  impossible to  finance. The benefit formulae have repeatedly been modified to provide
increasingly attractive retirement options regardless of the financial consequences. Both schemes are
running high actuarial deficits and have accumulated  substantial arrears in benefit payments. During the
waiting period until a pensioner is paid, benefits are not adjusted for inflation. Almost all pensioners
choose to take the maximum amount as a lump-sum. The residual pension is also not adjusted for
inflation and, in many cases, the remaining  pension levels are so low that the checks are worth less than
the postage required to mail them to the recipients. In addition, the schemes have been used to reduce
public sector employment through very attractive early retirement options. Early retirement is placing a
huge burden on the pension schemes and the government  has been unable to provide the required funds,
let alone pay its employer's share of contributions  on a regular basis.
The retirement rules for public sector employees raise severe distributional concerns. Those
pensioners who do get paid, receive very generous benefits compared to the standards of living of the
general population. The government is using scarce budgetary resources to finance benefits for a small
group  while expenditure  levels in  the  social  sectors have  dropped  to  critically low  levels.  Since
government  revenue  is  collected  predominantly  through  indirect  taxes,  the  poor  are  paying
disproportionately for benefits they do not receive.
The current structure of the pension system presents an obstacle to labor mobility between the
public and the private sector. Entitlements  to benefits are portable neither between the two public sector
schemes nor between the ZNPF and the public sector schemes. Thus, the incentive for public sector
employees to remain in the public sector is very high and mobility between sectors is discouraged.
All statutory pension schemes are experiencing serious problems in the area of management and
administration. The backlog in up-dating the individual  ZNPF balances is as long as 5 years in some
cases. The introduction of partial computerization  has caused further complications since the manually
kept records have to be reconciled with the computerized files. Evasion and non-compliance are high in
all institutions. According to estimates, only 70 percent of all employers contribute to the ZNPF,  the
CSPF has not received any employers' contributions since 1991, and the LASF has been able to collect
less than one third of due contributions in 1994.
14The major privately  managed  pension  schemes  - those  of ZCCM, the international  banks  and of
the oil companies  - appear  to be soundly  run, and to be trusted  by their members,  as evidenced  by the
steady increase in employees of  ZCCM opting to join the Mukuba scheme in  recent years.
Nevertheless,  the administrative  expenses  of these  schemes  appear  to be relatively  high by international
standards. Most well-established,  but  smaller employers  make pension arrangements  through the
management  services offered by insurance companies.  The overt charges made by the insurance
companies  for the management  of pension schemes  are quoted in the range of 5 to 6 percent of
contribution  receipts. Such an expense  ratio appears  to compare  very favorably  with the costs of, for
example,  the Mukuba  self-administered  scheme  which  amounted  to 27 percent  of contributions  in 1992.
However,  excess costs may be disguised  in the form of a poor return to the pension scheme on its
money invested  through the insurance  company. Conversely,  an apparently  high administrative  cost
may be compensated  for by superior  investment  returns.
The main problems  affecting  the management  of occupational  pension  schemes  in general  are a
lack of legislation,  regulation  and supervision  of occupational  pension  schemes,  a lack of secure and
profitable  investment  opportunities  which  explains  why  the portfolios  of all private  pension  funds  consist
only of Treasury  Bills  and real estate,  and a lack  of qualified  management  personnel.
15OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
Natonal Social  Protection Policy
Zambia has a strong tradition of mutual support based on family and community ties. Although
this has been disrupted by the consequences  of the economic crisis, inter- and intra-family transfers are
still relatively important in alleviating hardship and maintaining living standards. Any  public social
protection system should seek to complement and strengthen  these family and community ties rather than
replace them. A recent World Bank Poverty Assessment 4 has concluded that 69 percent of all Zambians
live in households with expenditures per adult below a poverty line based on nutritional and other basic
needs, and 55 percent do not have sufficient income to meet their basic nutritional needs. While poverty
is both more prevalent and more  severe in rural areas there has been  a dramatic increase in urban
poverty - only 4 percent in 1975 but now approximately  50 percent. Similarly there has been a decline in
social indicators with a downturn since 1985 in primary school enrollment rates, increased infant and
child mortality, and increased levels of malnourishment  among children.
The state has a  basic obligation to adopt policies aimed at alleviating poverty and improving
living standards. Given the narrow tax base and high levels of evasion tax revenues are insufficient to
meet social protection needs. Inevitably, these scarce resources must be targeted at the poorest and, in
general,  at  meeting basic  needs  for  health,  education,  housing,  sanitation, clean  water,  and  for
improving services and infrastructure which will provide opportunities  for income generating activities.
But there  is also need for  social protection of workers who are  temporarily or  permanently
deprived of their earnings through sickness, injury or  retirement. Here, income related benefits are
required. There are two possible sources for social  protection in this respect - either employers as part of
the conditions of service or some form of social security scheme. Zambia has already established the
basis for a social security system with the ZNPF and the pension schemes for public sector employees.
Many employers have established supplementary  pension schemes or entered into collective agreements
with their workers and many  individuals have taken some initiative to protect themselves. Thus  in
Zambia there is the basis of a private tier of social protection directed at the specific needs of individuals
or occupational  groups financed by employers  and individuals.
The need for policy cohesion and coordination between the various players - both public and
private - implies a corresponding need for a high-level broad based body, answerable perhaps to the
President or to the Minister responsible for Planning and Development. It would be undesirable to create
a new bureaucratic infrastructure in the form of an umbrella authority since this might entail significant
administrative expenditure. But a standing committee made up of senior representatives of each of the
institutions, the social partners and private sector schemes chaired by an appointee of the President might
be capable of providing the necessary level of coordination and supervision  without constituting another
layer of bureaucracy.
4 World Bank 1994a
16Developing  a Strategy
The Government of Zambia established several commissions  during the last 10 years to study the
problems of social  security and, in particular, of pension provision. It  was decided that,  given the
weaknesses of the provident fund as a form of social protection, its failure to invest profitably members'
balances in the past and its loss of credibility among the population, a pension scheme for private sector
and parastatal employees should be established. 5 It is recommended, however, that this scheme should
provide  only  basic  protection  for  old  age,  disability and  survivorship  and  be  supplemented by
occupational private pension arrangements. There are a number of strategic issues to be faced which will
determine  the  long-term development of a  pension system in  Zambia:  these  are  discussed in the
following paragraphs.
The basic challenges
There  are  three  basic  challenges for  the  establishment and  functioning of pension  schemes
which  are  particularly  critical  in  the  context  of African  countries.  Design issues  such as  choices
between defined-benefit and defined-contribution schemes, funding versus pay-as-you-go principles and
public versus private management are subordinated to the basic challenges of macroeconomic stability,
regulatory capacity and ability of coverage extension.
Macroeconomic stability is a  crucial condition for the functioning of any pension scheme or
social  security system.  Under the  circumstances of strong macroeconomic fluctuations and  high  or
volatile inflation rates,  it is extremely difficult to maintain the financial stability of a pension system.
The  financial  markets  in  countries  which  are  macroeconomically unstable  and  at  a  low  level  of
development typically do not offer adequate investment instruments to protect against such fluctuations.
Pension reserves  and real benefit levels - whether benefits are  paid out as pensions,  lump-sums or
annuities - are eroded quickly. Without macroeconomic stability, pension systems can neither offer old
age income security nor contribute to the mobilization of long-term savings.
The second challenge refers to the regulatory capacity of the government and its supervisory
agencies.  If the financial sector is not properly regulated and  supervised,  a pension scheme  cannot
perform adequately. This condition is independent of the type of scheme chosen; even a pay-as-you-go
scheme with  a minimal  amount of reserves  must,  for  example,  rely on  the  banking and  payments
systems. The importance of regulation and supervision increases with the degree of funding of a system
as well as with the degree of private sector participation in a compulsory pension scheme.  Although
voluntary pension plans should be  in principle regulated just  as carefully as mandatory  plans,  the
responsibility of the supervisory agencies becomes even greater when participation in a pension scheme
is mandatory.
5Most  provident  funds  in the English-speaking  Carribean  have  been transformed  to pension  schemes  since  the
1970s;  in Africa,  the most recent  example  of provident  fund  conversion  has been  Ghana.  The experience  of Ghana
has been studied  by many  other  African  countries  and has  encouraged  governments  to pursue  the same  avenue.
For a discussion  of provident  fund conversion  in Africa  see Gruat 1990
17The third  challenge to pension schemes, but also to  social security schemes more  generally,
consists in the extension of coverage.  Some countries are considering the extension of formal social
security benefits to the informal sector.  This extension, however,  is feasible neither from a  financial
nor from an administrative point of view. Although the poor in the informal sector are probably more
affected by  social insecurity than the majority of formal sector workers,  their protection will require
informal approaches to  social security.  Therefore,  all pension policy considerations should take into
account the  extent to which a system effectively can reach the groups it seeks to protect.
What type of scheme should be adopted ?
There are two main types of scheme6  from which to choose:
(i)  under  a  defined contribution scheme, the  contributions paid by  or on  behalf of the
worker are maintained in an individual  account as under the provident fund system. The income
from the investment accumulates with the contributions  to form a lump-sum which at retirement
is converted to an annuity. The contribution rate is usually fixed but because the final balance
and the annuity depends on financial  markets there is some uncertainty as to the final level of the
pension benefit. 7
(ii)  under the defined benefit system, a  promise is made that the member will receive a
pension of a prescribed amount on retirement either as a  flat rate benefit or proportional to
earnings.  The benefit is known in  advance but there  is some uncertainty as to  the  cost in
contributions of ensuring that this promise is kept. 8
In Zambia, a defined contribution system cannot by  itself be expected to produce an adequate
pension for those with low life-time earnings or for those who have broken periods of employment. If a
minimum benefit level is to be achieved, the system would have to be complemented by a government
backed minimum pension guarantee. The investment performance of the ZNPF raises doubts whether a
fully funded public scheme could be administered in the best interests of its members. 9 The volatility of
the financial markets has had a negative effect on annuities and those insurance companies which have
been operating pension schemes for employers have tended to move away from defined-contribution
'money-purchase' schemes in favor of defined benefit ones.
A pay-as-you-go  financed defined contribution scheme would avoid these problems but it would
require  fairly  sophisticated management techniques and  be  subject to  a  considerable  amount  of
government intervention in the setting of the notional interest rate and the annuity factor. Given the
6For  a complete  overview  of contractual  savings  institutions,  see Vittas  and Skully,  1991.
7Most  of these  schemes  are fully  funded  but recently  some  countries  have  introduced  pay-as-you-go  defined
contribution  schemes.  Under  this  approach,  notional  accounts  are kept  for each  member  by creating  a direct  link
between  contributions  and  benefits  and  crediting  notional  interest  - determined  by the government  and usually  linked
to the growth  of covered  wages  - to the accounts.  At retirement,  workers  use  their individual  account  to "buy"  an
annuity  from the pension  system  which  depends  on life expectancy  at retirement.
8 World  Bank 1994
9As demonstrated  by Chile  and other  Latin  American  countries,  these  risks  can be greatly  reduced  through  the
introduction  of a competitive  privately  managed  defined  contribution  scheme.  Due  to the underdevelopment  of the
financial  sector and the lack of regulatory  and supervisory  capacities  in Zambia,  however,  the Chilean  model  is
not considered  applicable  in Zambia.
18experience of the Zambian workers and employers with government intervention in the ZNPF,  this
option is not recommended.
It is therefore recommended that the basic social security pension scheme should be based on
defned  benefit principles and be financed exclusively from contributions without government subsidies.
It should offer only modest benefits in order to leave room for supplementary pension arrangements
which could be either of the defined contribution  or the defined benefit type.
The provident fund system is generally seen as having failed in Zambia although its failure is
largely  attributable to  adverse  economic  circumstances, political interventions,  and  inappropriate
management.  This  perception is  strong  because  the  members  bear  the  risk  and  thus  suffer  the
consequences of inflation and low investment returns. But the system does meet the demand for lump-
sum benefits and could also in the future form part of a supplementary defined contribution scheme in
which contributors could choose to save with an approved savings plan.  It would, however, place a
burden  on  the  administration  to  operate  two  systems  simultaneously and  good  administrative
performance is a  key requirement for the proposed pension scheme. Further, the provident fund has
suffered such a loss of confidence among its members that it would be difficult to restore credibility, and
there is a  danger that investment performnance  would continue to be inadequate. But some members'
balances will probably remain  after the  reform  and  should continue to  be  granted  interest.  Thus
payments will be made  under the provident fund for years to  come while members are  developing
entitlement  under the national pension scheme.
Should this social security pension scheme be mandatory for  aU private sector and parastatal
employers and their workers (as under the ZNPF) or should those who have occupational
pension schemes above a certain standard be allowed to contract-out?
The strength of a social security scheme is its basis in solidarity  between all sections of the work
force  and  through the  economies of scale  provided by  its universality. It  is thereby  able  to  take
miaximum  advantage of the concept of pooling risks and sharing costs on which it is founded. Allowing
certain employers to contract out would dilute this pooling. Furthermore, a national scheme guarantees
full portability of pension rights which are otherwise difficult to achieve in a developing country. An
alternative approach would be to allow for partial contracting-out, i.e.  above a prescribed level. This
would ensure solidarity and uniformity below that level and a choice above between increased coverage
under the public scheme and supplementary  coverage under private arrangements. However, this would
require a range of additional administrative  responsibilities  to ensure that every formal sector worker has
at least minimum mandatory coverage at all times regardless of the employer. This would represent a
considerable  burden in terms of supervision, enforcement and administration  of the scheme.
A mandatory scheme for all workers further enables the integration  of public sector employees
into the same scheme. Civil servants, teachers, members of the armed forces and employees of local
authorities are currently exempt from the ZNPF and instead covered by their own schemes.
19These schemes  provide very generous benefits at a  level which would clearly be beyond the
scope of a national scheme. They do not provide for any transfer or preservation of pension rights and
they thus inhibit labor mobility between the public and private sector. Therefore, there is a strong case
for the national pension scheme to also cover civil servants and other public sector employees.  But this
could not be done without making special provision for  some features of the present schemes which
should be retained as occupational benefits, similar to those arrangements made by private employers for
their workers. Also, acquired rights would have to be respected.
Some doubts can be raised whether the administration  of the proposed national pension scheme
could cope with the immediate integration of public sector employees as insured persons. One option
would be to segregate a core element of these special schemes equivalent to that provided under the
national  scheme which  would be  administered by  the  special scheme (for  example the  CSPF)  in
accordance with the rules of the national scheme. Total entitlement  under the special scheme could be
provided according to whatever conditions were considered appropriate and financially viable. Even this
arrangement would probably have to be phased in over a longer period of time.
The Type of the Social Security Pension Scheme
Having addressed the strategic choices for the role to be played by a national pension scheme,
there  are  several possible design options for  a  basic defined-benefit scheme.  The choices  may  be
influenced by factors such as the extent of desired redistribution between members or the implications
for administration. The basic choices lie between:
a.  a flat-rate scheme where benefits are paid at a standard rate subject to the satisfaction
of a minimum qualifying  period such as 15 years but contributions  paid by employers
and employees are earnings-related.
This system is easy to administer in that only records of employment are required for insured
persons since entitlement does not depend on  contributions. But the system has a  strong element of
redistribution from the higher paid to the lower paid which may not be acceptable. Since entitlement
would not increase after the satisfaction  of the minimum  qualifying period there would be no incentive to
contribute after that point which could lead to increased evasion. A modified version of this type of
scheme could provide  for  graduated increases in  the  flat rate  benefit for  each additional year  of
pensionable employment.
b.  a limited earnings-related  scheme where both benefits and contributions  are determined
by  salary  bands  (for example those  earning  between  K.50000  and  K.80000  pay
contributions  as a percentage of say K. 60,  000) and this amount is also used as the base
earnings  for a benefit  formula.
This reduces the degree of redistribution inherent in type (a) but requires a  higher level of
record keeping and  is regressive because higher income earners contribute proportionately less than
lower income groups.
20c.  a fully earnings-related  scheme where both benefits and contributions  are a percentage
of earnings with benefit entitlement  also dependent on a minimum qualifying  period and
a prescribedformula or accrual rate.
This is more equitable than type (a) but it implies the need for more sophisticated records. Type
(b) or (c) would require provision for a minimum benefit if the government wishes to protect those with
low  earnings.  Provision could  also be  made  for  a  benefit  ceiling to  limit  entitlement and  for  a
corresponding or higher contribution ceiling. The imposition of a contribution ceiling has the effect of
limiting the scope  of the  scheme and thus increasing the  need and  the demand  for  supplementary
schemes.
Replacement rates
The  replacement  rates  are  usually  determined by  a  benefit formula  based  on  length  of
pensionable employment and  average earnings.  Other  important factors  are  benefit or  contribution
ceilings, the adjustment of pensions in payment and the calculation of average pensionable earnings.
Many schemes in developing countries use earnings during the years immediately  prior to retirement but
this approach has proven to cause serious problems. On the one hand, there may be abuse through
collusion with employers; on the other hand, earnings levels particularly from physical occupations  may
fall at the end of the working life. This has led to the use of longer periods (such as the best 5 years of
the 10 years prior to retirement) or even average life time earnings.
Life-time earnings should be used for the purpose of determining entitlement to benefit. The
scheme should incorporate a revaluation  mechanism for automatic adjustment by linkage with a price or
wage index. But the linkage with prices, could, in periods of high inflation such as those experienced in
Zambia, result in pensioners receiving larger percentage increases than workers. In a national scheme
with wide coverage, most persons in formal sector employment can be expected to be covered for a
substantial period of their working life and a minimum period of  15 years is common as qualifying
period. On balance, it is recommended that Zambia should adopt a fully earnings related scheme with a
minimum pension level set at about 20 percent of average earnings.
There are various options for the determination of the pension formula. The most basic solution,
which would also be the easiest to administer, is a linear accrual rate of 1 percent of average insurable
earnings per  year of service. Another possibility would be to award a higher accrual rate during the
qualifying period of  15 years  in order  to ensure  that a  greater number  of workers  qualify for  a
meaningful pension; additional periods of  insurable employment beyond the minimum period could
attract an accrual rate of 1 percent per year. This option would redistribute income in favor of workers
with broken careers of employment. But it would be more expensive and would thus require a higher
contribution rate than a linear accrual rate. Regardless of the accrual rate chosen, the maximum benefit
level would be determined by a ceiling on insurable earnings (and contribution liability). This level could
be set at perhaps twice average earnings.  If policy makers wish to leave a system which redistributes
more towards low income workers, the ceiling for benefit calculation could be set at a lower level than
that for contribution calculation.
21The contribution rate for the basic pension scheme would depend on the desired replacement
rate and on the type of financial system adopted. Initially, the contribution rate for  a pay-as-you-go
financed scheme  could be  very  low  since pension rights would be  acquired only  very  gradually.
Contribution rates, however, would vary according to the individual  parameters of the scheme, such as a
linear  accrual  rate,  an  upper  limit on  the  accrual,  the  pensionable age,  credits for  disability  and
survivors' pensions, and whether initial  credits are given for previous ZNPF membership.
Pensionable  age
The determination of pensionable  age is a major issue which is dependent on a consideration of
the following factors: (i) the age generally accepted in the country as retirement age having regard to
employment  practice and life expectancy; (ii) the estimated cost of pension liability (payment of pensions
from age 55 instead of 60 could increase the overall cost of the scheme by 50 per cent); and (iii) the
employment situation (the need to match manpower resources with  jobs).
Life expectancy at birth is only 47 years in Zambia and under pressure from the high incidence
of AIDS. Although there  is no  reliable data, there is evidence that life expectancy at retirement is
considerably higher. At present, age 55 seems to be the generally accepted age of retirement in Zambia.
If the  pension scheme  was intended to  be  basic,  employers and  workers would wish  to  develop
supplementary  schemes. These schemes could make provision for early retirement. Taking into account
the cost factors there  is a case for  adopting age 60 as the retirement age. It is possible, however, to
provide the option of early retirement but the rate of pension payable would have to be reduced, by an
actuarially determined amount, to reflect the longer period of expected entitlement.
Invalidid
The principal qualifying requirement for invalidity is a permanent loss of earnings capacity and
a  minimum period  of insurable employment (membership under  the  scheme). Usually a  person  is
regarded as an invalid if, on medical examination by an independent  medical board, he or she is found
to have less than one third of the earnings capacity of a person of similar age and experience. Some
schemes recognize a  lower degree  of invalidity and provide reduced  rates  of benefit accordingly.
Invalidity pensions are effectively early retirement pensions and help to address the needs of persons
who towards the end of their working life become incapable of further employment. The impartial and
accurate  determination and  assessment of  invalidity does,  however,  provide  difficulty  in  many
developing countries, and this is a benefit which is open to abuse.
The qualifying period for invalidity is usually shorter than that for an old age pension to take
account of the fact that this contingency can occur at any time. Periods of 3 to 5 years are commonly
specified but there is usually a specific requirement that the claimant has a recent period of insurability.
In most countries, invalidity pensions are payable until normal pensionable age when they are replaced
by  an  old age pension; for  this  purpose, periods in  receipt of  invalidity pension are  regarded  as
equivalent to  months of contributory membership.
22Survivors
Surviving dependents are usually only eligible for pensions, if the deceased person was either a
pensioner at death or had completed a minimum qualifying period (usually the same period as is used for
invalidity pension). Under a social insurance scheme, the objective of survivors benefits is to provide a
continuing income to those members of the deceased's immediate family who were most dependent on
him or her  at the time of death. The approach is necessarily different from that of a provident fund
where the balance in the deceased member's account is paid to his or her  nominee. But, rather than
determine entitlement by an  individual investigation of family circumstances in every case,  it is the
practice for the legislation to prescribe the circumstances and the relatives where dependency is most
likely to occur. It is a difficult task both to design the rules which best suit the social situation in the
country and then to administer them in the face of inevitable anomalies, misunderstandings  and abuse.
A  widow  and  children  under  school  leaving age  are  usually  recognized as  the  primary
dependents but with some modification. Thus, pensions may only be payable to young widows for a
relatively short period unless they have young children to look after or are incapable of work. Otherwise
pensions are payable to a widow until her death unless she remarries earlier. The social circumstances
need to be taken into account and it is cominon both for the scheme to recognize more than one widow
and for the definition of 'widow' to include common law or custom marriages or long-standing  periods
of co-habitation. Similarly, flexibility is often extended to the definition of children so that it includes
illegitimate and adopted children and even children, not issue of the deceased, who were ordinarily
wholly or mainly maintained financially by  him such as younger  brothers  and  sisters. Entitlement
continues for  the  children until the  end of  full time education unless the child  is an  invalid (i.e.
permanently incapable of work).
Funeral Grants
It would be reasonable to pay a grant to cover the cost of the funeral of a deceased insured
person or his or her spouse subject to a qualifying condition of at least 12 months contributions in the
last 36 months. The amount would be payable to the person who bears the cost of the funeral expenses.
Transitional Provisions
When a new pension system is introduced with major changes, it is usual to make transitional
provisions for persons near retirement age who are otherwise unable to satisfy the minimum qualifying
conditions. The conversion of the Provident Fund Scheme to a Social Security Pension Scheme implies a
change from a defined-contribution  scheme to a defined-benefit  scheme. Usually, previous contributions
are converted into credits under the new scheme, in accordance with an actuarial formula.
However, the effect of hyperinflation has badly eroded ZNPF balances which would have little
value in any reasonable conversion formula. It is necessary to avoid overloading current and future
contributors with  the burden  of past  deficiencies of the provident fund.  Furthermore,  the  issue is
complicated by  the large volume of unposted records and  difficulties in determining members'  true
balances.
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In a developing country, such as Zambia, expenditure of a new pension scheme will initially be
low but will increase as more pensions are awarded, as life expectancy increases, and as the average
level of pension increases to take account of changing earnings levels. Under a pay-as-you-go system
this liability would be met by annually assessing the anticipated expenditure and setting the contribution
rate accordingly. Contribution rates would be low at the start but require steep increases later. By fully
funding future pension liabilities, the need for subsequent increases in the contribution rate could, in
principle be avoided. It would, however, require a high initial rate which may be unacceptable to a new
scheme in a developing economy.
An intermediate solution is partial funding of the system. One example of this is the  'scaled
premium'  method: the  contribution rate  is  fixed  at  a  certain percentage  to balance  revenues and
expenditure over  an estimated 'period of equilibrium', for  example ten  or  15 years.  When current
resources (contribution income plus interest from investments)  are no longer sufficient  to cover costs, the
contribution rate  is increased to a  level sufficient for  another equilibrium period.  The financing of
pension liability involves decisions based on  a  range of projections which are  often the product of
uncertain  assumptions and  questionable data.  Therefore, regular actuarial  analyses are  required to
review progress and determine the need for adjustments.
Several countries have experienced serious problems with this system because: (i) there has been
a failure to understand that under a partial funding system it is inevitable that the contribution rate will
increase resulting in political opposition  to an increase or the mechanism for effecting the increase has
been too cumbersome; (ii) under a long period of equilibrium, large reserves accumulate in the early
years and there is a risk of politically motivated low yielding investments  and excessive expenditure on
administration; (iii)the economic environment changed dramatically and inflation devastated the real
value of the pension reserves.
In determining the period of equilibrium it is important to  consider investment opportunities
available as well as the targeted level of the contribution rate. There are several strong arguments for a
shorter period of equilibrium and consequently  a lower contribution  rate: the limited scope for investment
opportunities in Zambia, the need to contain administrative costs, and the difficult economic situation
which severely restricts the contribution capacity of employers and employees. A low contribution rate
will also increase the scope for financing supplementary pension provision. But  it would need to be
understood by the social partners that a lower initial contribution rate will have to be compensated for in
the future as pension expenditure increases.
Administrative  Issues
The credibility and effectiveness  of the new pension scheme will heavily depend on the institution
charged with its administration. The design of the scheme will be irrelevant if it does not work. The funds
received from contributions and interest on the investment of reserves are held in trust pending claims by
the beneficiaries. The management of the national pension scheme and of its funds should be entrusted to
a new autonomous tripartite Board of Trustees. The membership of the Board should be based on equal
representation of workers,  employers, and  government.  The appointments should be  made  by  the
Minister of Labor and Social Security  but from nominations made by the respective bodies. The Chairman
24should not be restricted as at present to a defined Government official but should be appointed either by
the President,  in consultation with the  Minister and the social partners, or  should be  chosen by  the
Trustees from within their number. The Chairman should have a prescribed term of office; his or her
functions, powers and responsibilities should be defined in the legislation. Investment policy should be
primarily the responsibility of the Board but it would be advisable to provide for, perhaps even as a
statutory requirement, specialist advice from investment experts in consultation with the actuarial advisors
of the scheme. Guidelines should be set out in the legislation for investment policy including restrictions
on the scale and placement of the various sections of the portfolio.
Administrative expenditure has consistently  been too high under the ZNPF. The aim should be to
establish, for a public scheme, an administrative  infrastructure which operates according to sound business
practice.  There are two ways of achieving this: either through supervisory mechanisms and  legislative
controls of the responsible public institution  or by contracting with a private organization to act as fund
managers in return for an annual fee.  If the first alternative is chosen, it must be emphasized that there is
a need for improvement with regard to both the institutional  arrangements and administrative  procedures.
The administrative expenditure should be controlled either by prescribing limits in the legislation, or the
Board setting on an annual basis prior to the completion  of the budget the overall limit for administrative
expenditure expressed as a percentage of income. The option of contracting a private firm for functions
such as collection of contributions or investment management should be seriously considered since the
experience of contracting  a private firm for tax collection in Zambia has been very encouraging.
Public Sector Pension Schemes
The proposal to establish a uniform core of social protection applicable to all private and public
sector workers should be seen as a long-term objective. The first step is to establish the national pension
scheme for  the private sector.  Consideration could, however, be given to making new entrant public
servants  subject to  the  rules  of  an  integrated  scheme  with  a  core  provision  and  entitlement to
supplementary benefits. It  would also be possible to integrate (with phasing as necessary) the LASF
scheme with the new national pension scheme.
In the short-term there are three priority areas for the public sector schemes:
*  the benefit provisions are too generous and need to be reviewed: a distinction should be made
between provisions consistent with retirement for public servants and other measures which represent
favorable conditions of service and which, in particular, have developed as a  reaction to the need to
stimulate early retirement and thereby reduce staffing  levels
*  the financing of pension liability: this is closely associated with the above and it is essential that
the different bases of liability are distinguished and that financial provision is made accordingly; either
from the pension fund or directly from the Government
*  administration;  both the CSPF and the LASF are struggling with the volume of claims, inadequate
records and lack of computerization  facilities
An actuarial valuation of the CSPF is long overdue, but until this is completed it is not possible to
provide an accurate estimate of present and projected pension liability. When this has been done and
25decisions have been taken on the revision of the benefit structure, it will be  necessary to  review the
financing of the scheme and to determine the appropriate contribution  rate. But Government should honor
the obligation to pay the employer's contribution into the pension fund. Pensions liability has undoubtedly
been substantially underfunded because of the failure to pay the employer's contribution. Arrears due in
respect of  past  liability should be  paid  but the  revision of the  financial system should provide  an
opportunity for this to be phased.
Occupational  and Other Private Pension Arrangements
Many  private schemes have  been established in  response to  the  weaknesses in the  statutory
schemes but these private arrangements have also generally failed to provide effective social protection. If
the new national pension scheme should only partially meet the need for pension provision, this implies a
significant continuing role for supplementary  private provision. But this role should be within the scope of
statutory supervision to protect the interests of workers and to ensure that there is adequate provision for
the portability of pensions, for pensions adjustment and for the investment and management of funds. At
present,  pension schemes only need to satisfy limited conditions to gain entitlement to tax exemption.
There is a need for comprehensive regulations relating to the approval and operation of private pension
schemes and  also for the appointment of a  Registrar of Pensions to act both in  a  supervisory and  a
developmental role. This should be linked with proposals to develop similar regulatory provisions for the
supervision and development of the insurance industry.
Sequencing of the Reforms: A Proposed Inplementation Plan
The scale of the reforms envisaged will demand a gradual approach. Some aspects will clearly
require  further  study  and  analysis and  this  will  apply,  in  particular,  to  specialized areas  such  as
computerization, organization and management aspects and especially to actuarial analyses.
In the short-term, there is a need to focus on the most pressing problems and at the same time lay the
foundation for restructuring of the system. This will necessitate  the following:
general
*  formulate  and  publish  a  national  social  protection  policy  which  sets  out  division  of
responsibility  for the provision and financing of social protection and also strategy for future
development
for the public sector schemes
*  the settlement of outstanding  pension claims
*  revision of the early retirement and commutation  provisions
*  separation of liabilities  relating to special public sector early retirement and retrenchment
policies
26*  an actuarial valuation of the Civil Service Pension Fund
*  strengthening  of the operational  capacity of both Civil Service Pension Fund  and Local
Authorities  Superannuation  Fund
for the ZNPF
*  revision of investment  policy to ensure higher yields, to restrict state intervention and to
provide for expert guidance
*  an increase in the contribution  ceiling to about K. 100,000 but only with the understanding
that this represents the first step in a restructuring of the scheme
*  special efforts to update records, reduce claims processing times and improve compliance
*  take steps to reduce administrative  expenditure
The above reforms should provide the foundation  for a second  phase aimed at a more fundamental
restructuring of the system. The second phase involves legislation to establish a new national pension
scheme but also to strengthen the institutional  basis for other schemes to ensure that such schemes and
their Boards are sufficiently independent and accountable and not subject to external influence as to their
management and their financing.
This legislation should be enacted to:
*  convert the ZNPF into a modest social insurance pension scheme with a new name and a
fully autonomous  status with stronger tripartite representation
*  revise provisions in the labor legislation relating to employers' obligations to provide
retirement benefits in order to avoid a double burden on companies
*  restructure public sector schemes to remove (or at least restrict) special  early retirement and
commutation provisions and to provide the basis for phased introduction  of a core social
security component  equivalent to the benefits  provided by the new national pension scheme
with revised supplementary  provision to reflect the special occupational characteristics
applicable to public servants
*  establish regulatory provisions for the development  and supervision of private pension funds
including  both occupational  pension schemes and personal pensions or savings plans
27*  establish a new administrative  mechanism (for example a high level permanent committee) to
regularly review social protection policy and to both supervise  and coordinate its application
by all institutions  responsible.
The implementation  of these legislative changes will take time. It will be essential particularly in
the case of the national pension scheme to allow for sufficient  time (at least 12-18 months) for the process
of education and for the preparation of the administrative  systems and associated staff training.
As a long-term objective, the following  structure for the social security system could be foreseen:
*  a basic but earnings-related  national pension scheme applicable to all employees in the public
and private sector on a defined benefit  basis with a ceiling and a minimum pension level;
financed according to the scaled premium system; administered  initially by two separate
institutions  - one for the private sector, parastatals and local authority employees and the
other for civil servants but with the possibility  of an integrated administration  at a later stage.
Newly appointed civil servants and employees of local authorities, however, could be
insured in the new pension scheme.
*  supplementary  provision through occupational  pension schemes and personal pension plans
operating under supervision  by a Registrar of Pensions initially  on a voluntary basis but with
the future possibility  of mandatory provision when the sector has been fully developed and
the regulatory structure is effective.
28References
Dixon,  J.  (1989):  National  Provident  Funds:The  Enfant Terrible  of  Social Security,  International
Fellowship for Social and Economic Development Inc.
Gruat,  J.V.  (1990):  Social security  schemes in Africa.  Current  trends  and  problems,  International
Labour Review, Vol. 129, No.4, pp. 405-421
Queisser,  M.  (1991):  Social  security  systems  in  Southeast  Asia:  Indonesia,  the  Philippines  and
Singapore, International Social Security Review 44, pp.1 21-13 5
Valdes-Prieto,  S.  (1994):  Administrative Charges  in Pensions in  Chile,  Malaysia,  Zambia  and  the
United States, Policy Research Working Paper 1372, World Bank, Washington D.C.
Vittas,  D.  (1993):  Swiss  Chilanpore:  The  Way  Forward  for  Pension  Reform  ?  Policy  Research
Working Paper  1093, World Bank, Washington D.C.
Vittas,  D.  and  M.Skully  (1991):  Overview  of  Contractual  Savings  Institutions,  Policy  Research
Working Paper 605, World Bank,  Washington D.C.
World Bank (1994a):  Zambia Poverty Assessment, Washington, D.C.
World Bank (1994b):  Averting the Old Age Crisis, Oxford University Press, New York
29Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1692  Regulating Market Risk in Banks.  Constantinos Stephanou  December 1996  P. Infante
A Comparison of Alternative  37642
Regulatory Regimes
WPS1693  Famines and Economics  Martin Ravallion  December 1996  A. Ramirez
85734
WPS1694  What Can New Survey Data Tell Us  Martin Ravallion  December 1996  A. Ramirez
about Recent Changes in Distribution  Shaohua Chen  85734
and Poverty?
WPS1695  Are There Dynamic Gains from a  Jyotsna Jalan  December 1996  A. Ramirez
Poor-Area Development Program?  Martin Ravallion  85734
WPS1696  South-North Migration and Trade  Maurice Schiff  December 1996  M. Patena
A Survey  39515
WPS1697  Strategies to Develop Mortgage  Dwight M. Jaffee  December 1996  R. Garner
Markets in Transition Economies  Bertrand Renaud  37670
WPS1698  Regulatory Structure and Risk and  Ian Alexander  December 1996  R. Schneiderman
Infrastrcuture Firms: An International  Colin Mayer  30191
Comnparison
WPS1699  The Maturity Structure of Debt  Fabio Schiantarelli  January 1997  B. Moore
Determinants and Effects on Firms'  Alessandro Sembenelli  38526
Performance-Evidence  from the
United Kingdom and Italy
WPS1700  Child Nutrition, Child Health, and  Harold Alderman  January 1997  A  Ramirez
School Enrollment: A Longitudinal  Jere R  Behrman  85734
Analysis  Victor Lavy
Rekha Menon
WPS1701  Monitoring Environmental Standards.  Catherine Dion  January 1997  B. Laplante
Do Local Conditions Matter?  Paul Lanoie  85878
Benoit Laplante
WPS1702  Nontradables Inflation and  Hana Polackova  January 1997  H  Polackova
Macroeconomic Policy Mix  A Model  30182
with Policy Application to Transition
Economies
WPS1703  Financing of Government Liabilities  Hana Polackova  January 1997  H. Polackova
as the Population Ages in New  30182
Zealand
WPS1704  Citizen Complaints as Environmental  Susmita Dasgupta  January 1997  E. de Castro
Indicators: Evidence from China  David Wheeler  89121Policy Research Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1705  The Polish Experience with Bank  Fernando Montes-Negret  January 1997  T. Ishibe
and Enterprise Restructuring  Luca Papi  38968
WPS1706  Monetary Policy during Transition:  Martha de Melo  January 1997  C, Bernardo
An Overview  Cevdet Denizer  37699
WPS 1707 Trade Reorientation and Productivity  Simeon Djankov  January 1997  J. Ngaine
Growth in Bulgarian Enterprises  Bernard Hoekman  37947
WPS1708  Has Latin America's Post-Reform  William Easterly  January 1997  R. Martin
Growth Been Disappointing?  Norman Loayza  31320
Peter Montiel
WPS1709  Poverty Comparisons with  Jean Olson Lanjouw  January 1997  A. Ramirez
Noncompatible Data: Theory and  Peter Lanjouw  85734
Illustrations
WPS1710  Why Paper Mills Clean Up:  Raymond S. Hartman  January 1997  D. Wheeler
Determinants of Pollution Abatement  Mainul Huq  33401
in Four Asian Countries
WPS1711  Issues in Comparing Poverty Trends  Christine Jones  January 1997  R. Martin
Over Time in C6te d'lvoire  Xiao Ye  31320
WPS1712  Demand Elasticities in International  Arvind Panagariya  December 1996  J. Badami
Trade: Are They Really Low?  Shekhar Shah  80425
Deepak Mishra
WPS1713  Why Did Colombian Private Savings  Alejandro Lopez  January 1997  E. Khine
Decline in the Early 1990s?  37471
WPS1714  Fiscal Federalism in Bosnia-  William Fox  January 1997  Y. Jiwa
Herzegovina: The Dayton Challenge  Christine Wallich  34848
WPS1715  The Evolution of Poverty and Welfare  Sudharshan Canagarajan  January 1997  B. Casely-Hayford
in Nigeria, 1985-92  John Ngwafon  34672
Saji Thomas
WPS1716  Reforming Pensions in Zambia: An  Monika Queisser  January 1997  H. Arbi
Analysis of Existing Schemes and  Clive Bailey  34663
Options for Reform  John Woodall